The second feature of our model is to include the local benefits of biodiversity protection in addition to the overall benefits of conservation. With the benefits of global preservation (which is a public good), countries receive local and secondary benefits from their local biodiversity conservation. The benefits of local conservation may vary from country to country. Improved recreational opportunities, improved air quality, lower ambient temperature and improved health are some of the secondary benefits that can be seen at the local level due to conservation measures (Elmqvist 2012). According to the sensitivity analysis, the results are robust for changes in the parametric values of „bar” (q”) and „overline”: the maximum size of the stable coalition of the three-feature model under double-faced asymmetry is the size of ” (s) 2″ ( 2) ( A larger stable coalition of size 6 (composed of the 3 members of the BC type and all 3 of the Bc type) is achieved when the local benefits of conservation of „Alpha -1″) are shifted to ” Alpha 100.” We conclude that in the absence of transmissions, the size of a stable coalition under double-faced asymmetry is either maintained (s-2)) or increased (from „s” – 3) to ” (s” – 6)) relative to the symmetrical model. This result is different from the results of Winands et al. (2013), where asymmetry in ecosystems and wealth reduces the size of a stable coalition compared to the symmetrical case. In this first variant, Q represents the sum of the number of species received in all countries: Q – „sum q_” and q i is the level of conservation in the country i (number of species in the country i) and „Barq” is the highest possible level of conservation of a country, the „bar” being possible > 0″ of a country. In addition, b and c are utility or cost parameters, b > 0, c > 0, and α is the parameter that measures the weight of the benefits of local conservation, note that in our model specification, each level of conservation entails a positive cost, i.e. no conservation is free. For this model, the levels of balance are in the second stage of the game: the Australian Minister of the Environment will keep an updated list of existing conservation agreements.
We note that the size of stable coalitions in our model is small compared to the actual examples of IEA, which exist in many countries, such as CBD.B. The reason is that agreements, which are made up of a large number of signatories, generally involve little commitment and respect. As Barrett and Stavins (2003) pointed out under the Kyoto Protocol, moderate commitments facilitate broad participation.