The basic structure of the provisions of the AML will be essentially familiar to many; Overall, the provisions begin with the formation of the incremental lender group, provide for the mechanical process of setting up the incremental facility, and then set the conditions and limits of incremental debt before being supplemented by the provisions relating to the implementation of the incremental facility on the date of creation. In practice, it is clear that a borrower can first go to his existing group of lenders if he tries to take on additional debts, because his existing business relationships and the lenders` familiarity with credit will help the negotiations and the speed of execution. However, this is largely a point in that the requirement for borrowers to seek additional financing from their existing group of lenders before moving into a larger market, and only if existing lenders cannot borrow sufficient debt, has become increasingly rare in recent years, given the potential impact this process could have on timeliness and trade negotiations. While this aspect of the AML provisions may be important to some borrowers in the area of business credit, it is assumed that the borrower market, managed by sponsors, is unlikely to accept it. It is customary for the incremental facility clauses to contain provisions for the most favoured countries (MFN) under which the pricing of incremental facilities is not exceeded in relation to the existing facility in question, unless an additional tariff benefit is granted to the existing facility in this area, to the extent that it exceeds that level. The primary purpose of an MFN is to protect the value of the initial debt on the secondary market and, given that these provisions act to protect existing lenders and are widespread in the market, it is perhaps not surprising that the provisions of the AML contain restrictions on pricing an incremental facility. However, there are some striking points with respect to the provisions of the AML. First, in the case of an actual construction, there is no MFN provision in the AMA, since there is only one overall return ceiling that can be linked to any incremental debt. While this has the advantage of simplifying the provisions of the AML, borrowers may find such a construction restrictive, as it sets specific ceilings for setting incremental debt prices, which may limit a borrower`s ability to raise additional debt. Second, while the MFN is generally not only tied to margin, but only to margin (although it is not uncommon for the MFN to be solely margin-bound), a borrower is generally free to negotiate the allocation of that return as he sees fit. On the other hand, the provisions of the AML are highly prescriptive in that they not only limit the weighted average performance (which includes margin, all non-commitment fees and primary syndication rebates) that may be generated by incremental ease, but also seek to cap commitment and intermediation fees separately, which is no longer included in the current incremental facilities provisions. Finally, it has become increasingly common for all provisions of the MFN to include an expiration period of 6 to 24 months beyond which such price restrictions will no longer apply, although this sunset may be extended or removed during primary syndication, and the provisions of the MFN increasingly apply only for incremental maturities that are increased in the same currency as the existing facility.